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Résumé 
Cette étude vise à expliquer les variations dans les 
niveaux de transfert de fonds fédéraux vers les 
États dans différents types de dépenses, soit les 
dépenses totales, les dépenses militaires, les 
contrats de fourniture de biens et services, les 
subventions directes, les prêts et assurances. Ce 
rapport met à jour les recherches existantes en 
utilisant des données électorales, démographiques, 
fiscales et économiques pour les États s’étalant sur 
22 ans, de 1983 à 2004. En ayant recours à la 
méthode d’analyse statistique par « panel » du 
logiciel STATA, plusieurs variables économiques et 
politiques sont passées en revue pour évaluer leur 
impact pendant une période marquée par la 
résurgence du néo-conservatisme aux États-Unis. 
L’accent est mis notamment sur les variables 
interactives qui mettent en lumière l’alignement 
entre les partis qui occupent les fonctions exécutives 
et législatives au fédéral et dans les États.   
M.Sc. in Economics, Université de Montréal 
Research Assistant, Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, Montréal 
 
ollowing the 2004 presidential 
elections, red and blue colored maps 
circulated, dividing the United States 
into two colors by electoral vote 
allocated to the presidential candidates—
typically red for the Republican electoral votes 
and blue for Democratic electoral votes. A 
preponderance of these maps attempted to 
explain many economic, social and political 
factors along this red-blue divide.1
F
 
A graphic of particular interest is one that 
shows the “blue states”—the states that voted 
the Democratic ticket in 2004 as the “losers” 
in federal funding received, while the “red 
states”—the states that voted the Republican 
ticket are the “winners,” receiving far more 
federal aid than the blue states in per capita 
and net transfer terms. Paradoxically, the “red 
state" values of self-reliance, free markets, 
small government and fiscal restraint put the 
American conservatives in power, and 
returned George W. Bush and the  Republican 
congressional majority to power in 2004. This 
paper will take a recent historical perspective 
 1 
                                                 
1 This paper was submitted by the author as a research 
essay for her M.Sc. in economics at the Université de 
Montréal, under the supervision of François Vaillancourt 
and with the financial support of the CÉPÉA. 
in examining federal transfers to the states 
and its political-economic components 
 
Intergovernmental transfers and equity are a 
perpetual bone of contention amongst the 
Canadian provinces and between them and 
the federal government. Accordingly, there is a 
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wealth of information and scholarly study on 
fiscal federalism in Canada. In the United 
States, however, there are few rigorously 
explained political-economic models that 
examine federal transfers to the states, taking 
into account explicit transfers by category, 
such as block grants and spending programs, 
as well the net fiscal benefit.  The net fiscal 
benefit (NFB) is defined as the amount of  
public services received minus the amount of 
taxes paid. In this paper, the net fiscal benefit 
will be calculated for each state.  
To test whether there is a political-economic 
rationale for the allocation of federal funds, 
this report will model the transfers from the 
federal government to the states in per capita 
and net transfer terms as dependent 
variables. Independent variables that will be 
considered include payments of federal 
income and corporation taxes from the states, 
population of the states, Electoral College 
representation and votes for the past twenty-
two years, federal Congressional representa-
tion, state gubernatorial representation and 
state legislative representation.  
 
 
 
 
Section I: Literature Review and Analytical 
Framework 
The Chair in American Political and Economic 
Studies (Chaire d’études politiques et économiques 
américaines; CÉPÉA; http://cepea.cerium.ca) is a 
constituent part of the Centre of International 
Studies (Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales de l’Université de Montréal; CÉRIUM; 
www.cerium.ca). The Chair benefits from the 
financial support of Québec’s Ministry of 
International Relations (www.mri.gouv.qc.ca).  
The series « Notes & Analyses » publishes research 
briefs and more in-depth analyses, in French or in 
English, produced as part of the Chair’s activities. 
To receive these texts at time of publication, please 
register by writing us: cepea@umontreal.ca.  
Editorial responsibility for the series is shared by 
the Chair’s research team: Pierre Martin (director), 
Michel Fortmann, Richard Nadeau, and François 
Vaillancourt (research directors). Responsibility for 
the contents of these “Notes & Analyses” rests 
solely with their authors. © CÉPÉA 2007 
 
Review of Existing Literature: 
A partisan theory of federal budget allocation 
is a far from recent phenomenon and 
empirical studies abound in the literature. The 
majority of existing lworks focuses on the 
powers of the legislative branch of government 
at the federal level, particularly the impact of 
committee membership and that of 
individually powerful members of Congress. 
Studies on the impact of the president date 
back, in large part, to the New Deal presidency 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
 
However there are a few recent studies on the 
impact of the president in budget allocation, 
as well as annual studies of the federal budget 
and the States, a joint project between the 
Taubman Center for State and Local Govern-
ment at the Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University and Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan (Democrat of New York, 1976-
2000). This report is then descriptive by 
nature, comparing the different states in the 
five major areas of expenditure defense, non-
defense discretionary, Social Security, 
Medicare, and assistance programs. Following 
the death of Senator Moynihan, a similar 
report has not been published, although there 
is supposedly a report for 2003 in progress2.  
 
A review of recent literature has both provided 
inspiration and guidance to our report. Some 
important literature includes: 
 
Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending 
Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses and Why, Cary 
Atlas, Thomas Gilligan, Robert Hendershott 
and Mark Zupan (1995) 
 
The authors examine the distribution of 
federal net spending, defined as taxes minus 
expenditures, across the fifty states from 1972 
to 1990. The authors limit the scope of their 
inquiry to the legislative branch, and advance 
                                                 
2 Home page of lead report author, Herman B. “Dutch” 
Leonard shows the 2003 report as “in progress”:  
http://dor.hbs.edu/fi_redirect.jhtml?facInfo=pub&facE
mId=hleonard  
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the hypothesis of an “overrepresentation bias” 
that gives preference to small states. The 
paper examines the effect of this “overrepres-
entation bias,” and pays particular attention 
to the Senate, where a populous state such as 
California receives the same treatment as the 
far less populous Delaware. This paper was 
one of the first to account for this type of bias, 
and is often cited in subsequent literature.  
 
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: 
The Impact of the President, Valentino Larcinese, 
Leonzio Rizzo and Cecilia Testa (2006) 
 
The paper provides empirical evidence on the 
determinants of the U.S. federal budget allo-
cation to the states. Expanding and departing 
from existing literature that gives prominence 
to Congress and to vote-purchasing behavior 
with swing states and strongly supportive 
states, the authors conducted an empirical 
investigation on the impact of presidents 
during the period 1982–2000. This study 
takes the entire federal expenditure budget as 
the dependent variable. There are several 
separate hypothesis tested, with respect to 
presidential politics. States that heavily 
supported the incumbent president in past 
presidential elections tend to receive more 
funds, while marginal and swing states are 
not rewarded. Party affiliation is examined to 
the extent that the governor (state level 
executive branch) party affiliation is the same 
as the president. Larcinese et al find that 
states in which the executive branch party 
(the party of the governor) is aligned with the 
president’s political party receive more federal 
funds, while states opposing the president’s 
party in Congressional elections are penalized. 
They posit their results as evidence for presi-
dential engagement in tactical distribution of 
federal funds and also as support for partisan 
theories of budget allocation. 
 
There are several weaknesses to this 
approach, in that allocation of the federal 
budget is such that there is great flexibility in 
some categories of spending, whereas other 
categories are severely restricted by 
demographics, such as is the case with 
Medicare, a federal health-care program 
universally applied to all Americans over the 
age of 65 eligible for Social Security payments. 
Medicare is one of the largest single-category 
federal transfers to the states, and the 
transfer is calculated using a universal 
formula that is functionally immune from 
major, pork-barrel type politically-biased 
manipulations. Conversely, there are certain 
spending categories in which different 
branches of the government have more 
leeway. For example, the president, as the 
head of the U.S. Military has some 
discretionary impact in defense spending.  
 
The Impact of Federal Spending on House 
Election Outcomes, Steven Levitt and James M. 
Snyder (1997) 
 
The paper examines vote-purchasing behavior 
in the House of Representatives, to the extent 
that incumbent members of Congress are 
rewarded (by re-election) for bringing federal 
dollars into their district. Using an instru-
mental variables model, Levitt and Snyder 
account for the omitted variable bias en-
gendered by the potential variation in effort of 
representatives up for re-election. Incumbents 
expecting difficulty are expected to behave 
differently than those who do not, and thus 
may perhaps work harder to bring federal 
dollars to their district. Unfortunately, the 
time period covered in this paper is limited in 
scope to the eight years (1983-1990) covered 
by the Federal Assistance Awards Data 
System (FAADS), as this data set contained 
annual district-level outlays on a program-
matic basis, totaling over half of the federal 
budget. Most importantly, the paper makes 
the distinction between high and low-variation 
programs, the high variation programs being 
more discretionary in nature and thus more 
amenable to political manipulation rather 
than direct entitlement programs, such as 
social security and Medicare. Nonetheless, the 
empirical evidence produced from this paper 
differs than that from previous studies, in that 
they find evidence that an increase in federal 
spending benefits congressional incumbents, 
“purchasing” as much as 2% of the popular 
vote with an additional $100 in per capita 
spending. 
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Table 1: Summary of Relevant Research 
 
Authors (year) Subject Variables Data Estimation Method Results 
C. Atlas, M. 
Zupan,  
T. Gilligan, 
and R. 
Hendershott 
(1995) 
Allocation of 
net federal 
spending to 
the States 
 
Dependent variables: 
Per capita net federal spending; per 
capita entitlement spending;  
per capita defense spending 
 
Individual control variables: 
Per capita income, % rural 
population, % population with 
four-year degree, % over the age of 
65, % receiving public assistance, 
per capita state and local taxes, 
coastal  
 
Overrepresentation variables: 
Representatives per capita; 
Senators per capita 
1) Biannual political 
data from  Almanac of 
American Politics (1972-
1990) 
 
2) Biannual panel data 
from the Statistical 
Abstract of the United 
States, includes all data 
on population 
characteristics and 
federal net spending 
(1972-1990) 
 
Panel GLS estimation 
with state fixed effects 
using robust standard 
errors  
 
 
 1) Senators from 
“overrepresented” states procure 
approximately $787 more per 
capita in per capita federal 
spending; where as 
representatives from the same 
states obtain $407 more per 
capita 
  
2) A similar effect is observed in 
categories of spending, with the 
largest effect shown in defense 
spending 
 
3) All else equal, congressional 
contingents from less populous 
states secure a significantly 
higher level of net federal 
spending for their constituents 
 
V. Larcinese, 
L. Rizzo, and 
C. Testa 
(2006) 
Presidential 
impact on 
the 
allocation of 
the U.S. 
federal 
budget to 
the states 
Dependent variable: 
Federal expenditures per capita  
(real dollars) 
 
Individual Control variables: 
Senators per capita, electoral vote 
per capita, various demographic 
variables, income per capita, swing 
state, congressional membership in 
key  committees 
 
Presidential alignment variables: 
President-governor alignment, 
president-senator alignment, 
president-representative alignment 
1) Annual federal 
expenditures, population 
data from Statistical 
Abstract of the United 
States (1982-2000) 
 
2) Official Congressional 
Directory and Nelson 
and Benson (1993) for 
Congressional 
Committee membership 
and apportionment data 
 
Panel OLS estimation 
with a check for 
necessary standard-
error corrections for 
multicollinearity using 
variance inflation 
factor (VIF) evaluation, 
robust standard errors 
1) States that heavily supported 
the incumbent president in past 
presidential elections tend to 
receive more funds 
 
2) A governor belong to the 
same party of the president 
receive more federal funds 
 
3) States opposing the 
president’s party in 
Congressional elections are 
penalized.  
 
4) Generally supports of 
partisan theories of budget 
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Authors (year) Subject Variables Data Estimation Method Results 
allocation. 
 
S. Levitt, J. 
Snyder (1997) 
Impact of 
federal 
spending on 
House 
election 
outcomes  
Dependent variable: 
Per capita federal spending (in 
various categories) to a district 
 
Control variables: 
Population characteristics, share of 
democratic vote, share of 
republican vote, % share in state 
per capita income, incumbency, 
closeness to the state’s capitol city 
 
Instrumental variable: 
In-state out-of-congressional 
district spending 
1) District-level outlays 
of spending from 1983-
1990 from Bickers-Stein 
Federal Awards 
Assistance Data System, 
demographic and 
economic variables also 
from this data set 
 
 
2SLS methods using 
in-state out-of-district 
spending  as 
instrumental variable 
to solve the omitted 
variables problem of 
“effort” exerted by the 
incumbent to retain 
his or her seat, OLS 
used as baseline for 
comparison 
1) Instrumental variable 
approach yields coefficients that 
are five times larger than the 
OLS estimate 
 
2) Need to differentiate between 
different types of expenditures, 
namely high-variation and low-
variation programs 
 
3) Evidence of vote-purchasing 
behavior: an increase of $100 in 
per-capita spending shows a 2% 
increase in the incumbent’s 
share of the popular vote 
B. Schor (2005) Determinants
of defense 
budget 
allocation  
Dependent variable: 
Per capita federal defense spending 
(logarithmic form) to a district 
 
Control variables: 
Population characteristics, share of 
democratic vote, share of 
republican vote, income per capita, 
district voting patterns during 
presidential election years 
1) District-level outlays 
of spending from 1983-
1992 using the 
Consolidated Federal 
Funds Report 
 
2) Current population 
survey (CPS) for 
demographic variables 
 
3) Congressional 
Quarterly for 
presidential vote totals 
 
4) Bureau of Economic 
Analysis for income 
totals 
Bayesian multilevel 
modeling using 
Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo simulations; 
rejects panel 
regressions using 
corrected standard 
errors 
1) No support for effective 
“targeting” of home states by 
House legislators. 
 
2) Delegations dominated by 
Democrats unable to deliver 
more to their states (Democrats 
were controlling party of House 
during entire time period) 
3) Highlights need to include 
predictors at different levels of 
analysis (e.g. federal, state, and 
interaction variables); previous 
literature assumes only local 
district level effects 
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The Determinants of Success of Special Interest 
in Redistributive Politics, Avinash Dixit and 
John Londregan (1996) 
 
Economic redistribution occurs on two levels 
in the political process, the first on a grand 
scale reflecting the economic beliefs of a 
country, and is achieved through taxation and 
social spending. On a secondary level, 
economic redistribution can occur more 
tactically, and can coincide with the grander 
scheme of redistribution, and can take on a 
variety of forms including subsidies, tax 
expenditures, public works projects and other 
schemes that are often labeled as “pork 
barrel.” This theoretical paper examines the 
determinants of whether a heterogeneous 
interest group will receive favors in pork-
barrel politics, where there is majority voting 
in a two-party system. Individuals must 
choose between party affinity and their own 
transfer receipts. The results of this model can 
yield two different outcomes as special cases, 
which are the competing theories of the “swing 
voter” and “machine politics.”  In the swing 
voter outcome, both parties are equally 
effective at delivering transfers and thus 
attempt to capture the middle, politically 
centrist ground through economic favors. The 
machine politics outcome is achieved if each 
party is more effective in delivering favors to 
its own support group, thus leading the 
political parties to reward its core supporters. 
 
These results can be extrapolated on an 
aggregate level, as these results can be applied 
to groups of people at the state level, yielding 
either favors for swing states or rewarding 
those states that are stalwarts of either party. 
They suggest that that many economically 
inefficient policies with unequal allocation 
across a society fit well within this model of 
redistributive politics, that is, programs with a 
high potential for variance and unequal 
spending are often exploited to favor certain 
political outcomes in a two-party electoral 
system. 
 
 
 
 
Modeling Federal Transfers to the States: 
 
The proposed economic models are: 
 
Federal Expendituresstc= αt + βXst + δYst  + θZst 
 
Net fiscal benefitstc= αt + βXst + δYst  + θZst
 
The dependent variable is expressed in total 
dollar terms. X is a vector representing 
demographic and economic data, Z is a vector 
representing political-institutional variables, 
and Y is an instrumental variable (when 
necessary) to correct for the well-documented 
overrepresentation bias, as well other 
measures to better document the effect of 
representatives in their district. The subscript 
“s” denotes the state, “t” the year, and “c” the 
category of expenditure or the net fiscal 
benefit. Regressions use random-effects GLS 
methods for panel data with STATA 9.0, using 
instrumental variables wherever necessary.  
 
Three hypotheses are tested. The first two 
hypotheses correspond to federal spending 
categories (per the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Report) and the final hypothesis 
corresponds to the allocation of the net fiscal 
benefit. 
 
H1: Political alignment by various 
combinations of actors on the federal level 
and between the federal and state level is 
important (alignment with majority party) 
for certain federal spending categories. 
 
To test this hypothesis, the following model is 
proposed:  
 
Expenditure categoryst = populationst + per 
capita tax burdenst + gross state product per 
capitast + gross state product per capitast-1 + 
electoral vote per capitast + voted for sitting 
presidentst + President-Governor alignmentst + 
Senate majority alignmentst + House majority 
alignmentst + President-State Congress 
alignmentst 
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H2: Pure party affiliation on federal and 
state levels is an important determinant 
for certain federal spending categories. 
 
The hypothesis is tested using the model: 
 
Expenditure categoryst = populationst + per 
capita tax burdenst + gross state product per 
capitast + gross state product per capitast-1 + 
electoral vote per capitast + voted for Republican 
President in officest + voted for Democrat 
President in officest + Republican Governorst + 
Democrat Governorst + both Senators 
Republicanst + both Senators Democratsst + 
majority of Representatives Republicanst + 
majority of Representatives Democratst + State 
Senate majority Republicanst +  State Senate 
majority Democratst + State House majority 
Republicanst + State House majority Democratst
 
H3: The net fiscal benefit per capita can be 
allocated according to a majority alignment 
model or political party alignment model. 
 
The hypothesis is tested using the following 
model:   
 
Net fiscal benefitst = electoral vote per capitast + 
gross state product per capitast + gross state 
product per capitast-1 + gross state product per 
capitast-2 + gross state product per capitast-3 + 
gross state product per capitast-4 + gross state 
product per capitast-5 + gross state product per 
capitast-6 + voted for sitting presidentst +  
President-Governor alignmentst + Senate 
majority alignmentst + House majority 
alignmentst + President-State Congress 
alignmentst
 
Section II 
 
Data Selection: 
 
The database used for the study draws from 
several sources, and is both political and 
economic in nature. Political data includes 
real changes observed every two years, with 
some categories exhibiting more variation 
than others. The presidential vote data 
includes the Electoral College vote 
apportionment and allocation by party, while 
the federal legislative branch includes 
apportionment data as it affects the House of 
Representatives. Changes in apportionment 
are made following the decennial census, and 
thus are applied for elections in 1982, 1992, 
and 2002, resulting in electoral office change 
early in the following year (1983, 1993, and 
2003). These changes reflect real population 
and demographic shifts among the states, 
which shifts the allocation of four hundred 
and thirty-five representatives amongst the 
fifty states and disperses five hundred and 
thirty-eight electoral votes among the states 
and the District of Columbia. Each member of 
the House of Representatives serves a two year 
term and may be re-elected an unlimited 
number of times. Senators serve for staggered 
six-year terms so that elections are held for 
approximately one-third of the seats every 
other year; there are no term limits. On the 
state level, term limits, length of term and 
internal apportionment varies widely for the 
state level congress, as does the quantity of 
senators and representatives within each 
state. To facilitate comparison, the state-level 
congresses are assigned binary variables that 
represent the majority party within the State 
Senate and the State House of 
Representatives. This data was obtained from 
the United States Congressional Almanac and 
the Book of the States.  
 
The economic data includes federal transfers 
to the states, organized by major spending 
category. This paper makes use of the 
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), 
annually published by the U.S. Department of 
the Census. This document aggregates the 
federal government expenditures or 
obligations in state, county, and sub-county 
areas of the United States (including the 
District of Columbia and U.S. Outlying Areas). 
The CFFR contains statistics on the 
geographic distribution of federal program 
expenditures and obligations, using data 
submitted by federal departments and 
agencies. The CFFR expenditure data is 
“much more comprehensive than the much 
more commonly used Bickers-Stein Federal 
Awards Assistance Data (Shor 2005),” which 
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Table 2: Summary Definitions of Dependent Variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Total Expenditures  all government spending and obligations, excluding 
contingent liabilities (total dollars) 
Consolidated Federal 
Funds Report (CFFR) 
Defense Expenditures  expenditures for all Department of Defense agencies (total 
dollars) 
CFFR 
Grants Awarded  all project-specific grants, all formula grants prescribed by 
law (total dollars) 
CFFR 
Total Procurement  Value of obligations for contract actions accorded to the 
place of performance (total dollars) 
CFFR 
Defense Procurement  Value of obligations for defense-related contract actions 
accorded to the place of performance (total dollars) 
CFFR 
Other Procurement  Value of obligations for nondefense-related contract actions 
accorded to the place of performance (total dollars) 
CFFR 
Retirement and 
Disability  
all Social Security payments and federal employee 
retirement and disability benefits (total dollars) 
CFFR 
Other Payments Other direct payments to individuals other than retirement 
and disability, direct payments not for individuals (total 
dollars) 
CFFR 
Net Fiscal Benefit amount of public services received minus the amount of 
taxes paid (total dollars) 
CFFR, Tax 
foundation, Book of 
the States 
was used in Atlas et al and Levitt and Snyder, 
1995 and 1997. The population data is data 
from the official U.S. Census (for 1990 and 
2000) and estimates for all other years. The 
state federal tax burden data is collected from 
the Tax Foundation and the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Gross state product (GSP), 
a measure of each state’s economic output in 
current dollars, is obtained from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.  
Alternatively, total expenditures can be 
defined as:  
 
Total expenditures = defense expenditures + 
grants awarded + other procurement + 
retirement and disability + other payments   
 
Defense expenditures include defense 
procurement; while total procurement is 
composed of defense and non-defense related 
federal procurement dollars.  
 Twenty-two years of data, from 1983 to 2004, 
is organized in yearly panels for forty-six 
states, excluding the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii and Alaska—following a well 
established precedent in the literature. The 
states of Virginia and Maryland were also 
excluded from analysis. As the federal 
expenditure data is allocated by place of 
performance, including Virginia and Maryland 
could obscure political determinants in the 
allocation of federal funds.  
The statistical properties of the dependent 
variables, in total actual dollar terms per 
capita, are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Independent Variables: The independent 
variables are defined in the Table 4. A 
summary of the statistical properties of each 
independent variable follows in Table 5. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 show the frequency and distri-
bution of four key dependent variables in per 
capita terms: total expenditures, defense 
expenditures, grants awarded and the net 
fiscal benefit. 
 
Summary of Variables Used in Analysis: 
 
Dependent Variables: The definition and 
source of the dependent variables for all 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 2. 
 8 
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Table 3: Statistical Summary of Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Total Expenditures  1012 4690.7 1448.3 2056.4 10457.1 
Defense Expenditures  1012 734.8 380.4 114.8 2783.7 
Grants Awarded  1012 881.4 437.2 244.3 3241.8 
Total Procurement  1012 636.5 437.4 97.8 3137.1 
Defense Procurement  1012 390.8 315.5 37.6 2560.8 
Other Procurement  1012 245.7 308.2 19.1 2596.1 
Retirement and Disability  1012 1585.0 482.0 578.9 3216.5 
Other Payments 966 894.6 492.1 185.8 4166.8 
Net Fiscal Benefit 1012 192.7 1382.3 -5756.6 5618.0 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Definitions of Independant Variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Population United States resident population United States 
Bureau of the 
Census 
Population2 Square of population United States 
Bureau of the 
Census 
Tax burden per 
capita 
Average federal taxes paid, per capita, expressed in 
current dollars; includes accounting for the federal 
deficit as well as all federal taxes including social 
insurance, excise, income and corporate 
Tax Foundation 
Income per capita Average income, per capita of a state's residents United States 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Electoral vote per 
capita 
Electoral votes of a state divided by population, the 
votes are equal to a state's total number of 
representatives in congress (House plus Senate) 
The Book of the 
States, United 
States Bureau of the 
Census 
Senators per capita Number of senators (2) divided by population United States 
Bureau of the 
Census 
GSP per capita Gross state product, expressed in per capita terms United States 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Voted for sitting 
president 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if state voted for 
sitting president 
The Book of the 
States 
President-governor 
alignment 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if president and 
governor are of the same political party 
The Book of the 
States 
Senate majority 
alignment 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if both senators 
from a state are aligned with the majority party 
The Book of the 
States 
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House majority 
alignment 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if 50%+1 
representatives from a state are aligned with the 
majority party 
The Book of the 
States 
President-State 
Congress majority 
alignment 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if president and 
the majority party of a State's Congress are of the 
same political party 
The Book of the 
States 
Voted for 
Republican sitting 
president 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if state voted for 
a Republican sitting president 
The Book of the 
States 
Voted for Democrat 
sitting president 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if state voted for 
a Democrat sitting president 
The Book of the 
States 
Republican 
governor 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if state's 
governor is Republican 
The Book of the 
States 
Democrat governor Binary variable that takes value of 1 if state's 
governor is Democrat  
The Book of the 
States 
Senators both 
Republican 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if both senators 
from a state are Republican 
The Book of the 
States 
Senators both 
Democrat 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if both senators 
from a state are Democrat 
The Book of the 
States 
Representatives 
majority 
Republican 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if most 
representatives from a state are Republican 
The Book of the 
States 
Representatives 
majority Democrat 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if most 
representatives from a state are Democrat 
The Book of the 
States 
State Senate 
majority 
Republican 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State Senate is 
majority Republican 
The Book of the 
States 
State Senate 
majority Democrat 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State Senate is 
majority Democrat 
The Book of the 
States 
State House 
majority 
Republican 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State House is 
majority Republican 
The Book of the 
States 
State House 
majority Democrat 
Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State House is 
majority Democrat 
The Book of the 
States 
Coastal Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State is on 
coastline (Gulf of Mexico, Pacific Ocean, Atlantic 
Ocean) 
Map of the United 
States 
Swing State Binary variable that takes value of 1 if State voted 
within 5% of the winning margin in last presidential 
election 
Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential 
Elections 
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Table 5: Statistical Summary of Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax Burden per capita ($US) 1012 4497.961 1629.382 1578.888 11512.43 
Income per capita ($US) 1012 21280.19 6736.325 8576 45412 
GSP per capita ($US) 1012 25408.74 8325.259 10114.91 63004.4 
Voted for sitting president 1012 0.7371542 0.440397 0 1 
President-governor alignment 1012 0.3320158 0.4711695 0 1 
Senate majority alignment 1012 0.3300395 0.4704595 0 1 
House majority alignment 1012 0.5592885 0.4967179 0 1 
President-State Congress majority alignment 1012 0.2183794 0.4133506 0 1 
Population density (pop per square mile) 1012 143.5828 189.9263 4.635149 995.7769 
Electoral vote per capita 1012 2.69E-06 1.05E-06 1.39E-06 6.62E-06 
Senators per capita 1012 9.75E-07 9.89E-07 5.58E-08 4.41E-06 
Population  1012 5325959 5776611 453401 3.58E+07 
Population squared 1012 6.17E+13 1.55E+14 2.06E+11 1.28E+15 
Voted for Republican sitting president 1012 0.5335968 0.4991166 0 1 
Voted for Democrat sitting president 1012 0.2035573 0.4028425 0 1 
Republican governor 1012 0.5158103 0.4999971 0 1 
Democrat governor 1012 0.4703557 0.4993672 0 1 
Senators both Republican  1012 0.2885375 0.4533064 0 1 
Senators both Democrat 1012 0.2924901 0.4551311 0 1 
Representatives majority Republican 1012 0.3695652 0.4829257 0 1 
Representatives majority Democrat 1012 0.4841897 0.4999971 0 1 
State Senate majority Republican 1012 0.4011858 0.4903808 0 1 
State Senate majority Democrat 1012 0.5533597 0.4973904 0 1 
State House majority Republican 1012 0.3695652 0.4829257 0 1 
State House majority Democrat 1012 0.5948617 0.4911615 0 1 
Swing State 1012 0.1976285 0.3984072 0 1 
Coastal state 1012 0.3685771 0.4826574 0 1 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Total Expenditures in 46 American States: 1983-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Distribution of Defense Expenditures in 46 American States : 1983-2004 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Grants Awarded in 46 American States: 1983-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Net Fiscal Benefit in 46 American States: 1983-2004 
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Section III: Empirical Results: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Political alignment by 
various combinations of actors on the 
federal level and between the federal and 
state level is important (alignment with 
majority party) for certain federal spending 
categories 
 
In this section, we will model the dependent 
variable in per-capita terms. The preference in 
the relevant literature for a dependent variable 
in this form is clear (Atlas et al, 1995; Levitt 
and Snyder, 1997; Larcinese et al, 2006). We 
will adopt a logarithmic transformation for the 
high-variation categories of procurement and 
defense-related spending, following Shor 
(2005).  
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Total expenditures:  
This category includes the aggregate of all 
government spending and obligations, 
excluding the contingent liabilities of loan 
insurance and direct loans. A random-effects 
GLS regression3 with robust standard errors 
                                                 
                                                                                    
3 The random-effects model (for this model and all 
subsequent models) was chosen using a Hausman test 
for random-effects specification, testing the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The 
results were insignificant, with Prob>chi2 greater than 
on total federal expenditures per capita yields 
the results show in Model 1.1:  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A dollar increase in per capita tax 
burden decreases the per-capita 
amount received by the state by 50 
cents; 
- An increase by a dollar in per capita 
income increases the per-capita 
amount received by the state by 32 
cents;  
- A state that elected the president into 
office receives less than a state that 
voted against the sitting president, for 
any part of a 4-8 year term; 
- Alignment variables are not important 
in the aggregate totals, however, party 
alignment between the President and 
the majority party of a State’s legisla-
ture yields a $204 per capita increase 
in total federal expenditures; 
Model 1.1: Total Expenditures (per capita), 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.5424816 4.67E-02 -11.6 0 
Income per capita 0.325597 1.91E-02 17.09 0 
GSP per capita 0.0030378 1.29E-02 0.23 0.814 
Voted for sitting president -113.0688 3.96E+01 -2.86 0.004 
President-governor alignment 52.74592 35.7826 1.47 0.14 
Senate majority alignment 0.198546 33.29325 0.01 0.995 
House majority alignment 41.3899 33.00071 1.25 0.21 
President-State Congress majority alignment 204.8054 44.3402 4.62 0 
Population density  -3.469659 0.5129692 -6.76 0 
Electoral vote per capita 2.60E+08 1.43E+08 1.82 0.068 
Senators per capita 2.06E+08 1.76E+08 1.17 0.242 
Coastal state 640.3563 168.8857 3.79 0 
Constant -514.8069 340.012 -1.51 0.13 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.8953     R2 (between) = 0.0049     R2 (overall) = 0.6047 
- A coastal state receives approximately 
$640 more per capita than a non-
coastal state. 
 
Results for the political variables in the 
majority alignment model reveals that voting 
 
.05, and thus justified the use of a random-effects 
model.  
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for the sitting President does not have a 
favorable impact on the state’s total federal 
expenditure dollars. Alignment with the house 
majority is not significant, and would seem to 
contradict Levitt and Snyder’s (1997) results, 
as well as their predecessors in the literature. 
The effect of House majority alignment is 
perhaps understated in this model. Given that 
a populous state such as Ohio (17 
representatives) or California (53 
representatives)4 sends many members, 
whereas less populous states such as 
Wyoming have but one representative, the 
effects of a powerful member of the House are 
primarily felt within a district, which can be 
part of a state or the entire state. As the Levitt 
and Snyder paper indicates, this can be 
corrected by examining district-by-district 
expenditures, using as instrumental variable 
the out-of-district but in-state total 
expenditures received, but a valid data set is 
only available for 1983-1990.  Furthermore, 
due to decennial reapportionment, it is not 
possible to conduct district-corrected studies 
for more than ten years. For purposes of this 
paper, it is difficult to control for the precise 
geographic impact a member of the house 
would have on his or her district, as the 
period studied extends far beyond 1983-1990, 
the period for which such an instrumental 
variable method is available. To correct for 
this, Atlas et al (1995) and Larcinese et al 
(2005) include the variables senators per 
capita and electoral vote per capita to correct 
for the overrepresentation bias. We have 
included these variables in the regressions. 
Indeed, this paper is more concerned with 
global impacts of alignment with the majority 
or with political party rather than specific 
determinants for individually powerful 
members of the federal legislative branch. A 
previously unstudied variable, party alignment 
between the President and the controlling 
party of a state’s congress is significant at the 
0% level. Coastal states receive more than 
non-coastal states; this is primarily due to the 
larger amounts of spending that are allocated 
towards coastal defense and are aggregated in 
the total per-capita expenditure amounts.  
 
                                                
4 Following the 2000 Census re-apportionment, current 
as of the 2004 elections 
 
Defense Expenditures: 
Defense expenditures are computed by 
totaling the expenditures for all Department of 
Defense agencies.  Model 2.1 takes the 
natural logarithm5 of per-capita defense 
expenditures as the dependent variable: 
 
 
5 Following precedent in Shor (2005), wide disparities 
amongst states in this spending total can be smoothed 
out by taking the natural logarithm. All procurement 
categories will also be expressed in logarithmic form  
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Model 2.1: Defense Expenditures (logarithm of per capita amounts) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -1.94E-04 0.0000151 -12.9 0 
Income per capita 4.03E-05 7.01E-06 5.75 0 
GSP per capita 0.0000106 4.67E-06 2.28 0.023 
Voted for sitting president -0.0500139 0.0161867 -3.09 0.002 
President-governor alignment 0.0641802 0.0143281 4.48 0 
Senate majority alignment 0.0102201 0.0141644 0.72 0.471 
House majority alignment 0.052483 0.0133454 3.93 0 
President-State Congress majority alignment 0.0331966 0.0174987 1.9 0.058 
Population density  -0.0012576 0.0003195 -3.94 0 
Electoral vote per capita 154548.8 61569.06 2.51 0.012 
Senators per capita -52153.33 87959.37 -0.59 0.553 
Coastal state 0.4645287 0.20761 2.24 0.025 
Constant 5.823025 0.1578088 36.9 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.2481     R2 (between) = 0.0162     R2 (overall) = 0.0311 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase of $100 in per capita tax 
burden decreases per-capita defense 
expenditures by 2%; 
- An increase of $1000 in per capita 
income increases per-capita defense 
expenditures by 4%; 
- An increase of $1000 in GSP per capita 
increases per-capita defense 
expenditures by 1%; 
- Voting for the sitting president 
decreases federal defense dollars per 
capita by 5%; 
- Party alignment between the president 
and the governor increases federal 
defense spending in the state by 6.4%, 
while party alignment between the 
president and the state legislative 
branch increases defense spending by 
3.3%; 
- A majority of representatives aligned 
with the controlling party of the House 
increases per capita defense spending 
by 5.2%; 
- Less densely populated states receive 
more than higher-density states; 
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- Coastal states receive 50% more in 
defense spending than non-coastal 
states. 
 
Less-wealthy states receive a significantly 
larger share of the defense spending pie, 
which could be indicative of the fact that more 
defense employees also live in those states.  
Politically, a vote for a sitting president is not 
significant, while alignment between the 
governor and the president is very significant. 
This alignment variable was first studied in 
the recent Larcinese et al (2006) paper6. 
Amongst other political variables, alignment 
with the House majority and President- State 
congress alignment are significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively.  
 
Grants Awarded: 
The grants awarded category includes two 
different types of grants, formula grants and 
project grants. Formula grants are “allocations 
of money to States or their subdivisions in 
accordance with a distribution formula 
prescribed by law or administrative regulation, 
for activities of a continuing nature not 
confined to a specific program;”7 while project 
grants are defined as “the funding, for fixed or 
known periods, of specific projects or the 
delivery of specific services or products 
without liability for damages for failure to 
perform. Project grants include fellowships, 
scholarships, research grants, training grants, 
 
6 Only in respect to per-capita total federal expenditures 
7 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) 
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traineeships, experimental and demonstration 
grants, evaluation grants, planning grants, 
technical assistance grants, survey grants, 
construction grants, and unsolicited 
contractual agreements.” This category 
includes both intergovernmental grants and 
grants to individuals.   
 
The regression on grants awarded per capita 
yields Model 3.1. 
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Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A state receives 10 cents for every 
dollar of per capita income; 
- A state receives 20 cents less per dollar 
of per capita tax burden; 
- The political alignment variable of any 
significance is the alignment between 
the president and the state congress, 
which procures approximately $60 
more dollars in grants spending per 
person;  
- Less densely populated states receive 
more per capita than urbanized states;  
- Coastal states receive $110 more per 
capita than landlocked states.  
 
The tax burden per capita is negative and 
significant in both regressions, indicating once 
again a transfer from the richer-income states 
to the lower-income states. For every dollar 
increase in per-capita tax burden, each model 
predicts a loss to the state of either $3,800 or 
$3,200, respectively, in federal grants dollars. 
There is little evidence of a presidential 
“reward” to the states that placed him in 
office.  The only political variable showing 
statistical significance is that of President-
State Congress party alignment, whereas 
geographic factors seem to factor heavily into 
grants spending. A potential explanation could 
be that components of grants, such as 
highway spending, are more required in states 
that cover a wider geographic expanse.  
Model 3.1: Grants awarded (per capita), 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.2217028 0.015477 -14.3 0 
Income per capita 1.13E-01 0.0052689 21.37 0 
GSP per capita -4.30E-03 0.0034093 -1.26 0.207 
Voted for sitting president -21.34326 13.56105 -1.57 0.116 
President-governor alignment -2.091315 10.85167 -0.19 0.847 
Senate majority alignment -0.6338944 10.42645 -0.06 0.952 
House majority alignment -4.433571 11.77089 -0.38 0.706 
President-State Congress majority alignment 58.19225 13.4862 4.31 0 
Population density  -0.6174992 0.1386017 -4.46 0 
Electoral vote per capita 6.10E+07 3.51E+07 1.74 0.082 
Senators per capita 9.09E+07 4.20E+07 2.16 0.031 
Coastal state 111.4297 40.25515 2.77 0.006 
Constant -606.4701 96.26826 -6.3 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.8775     R2 (between) = 0.2387     R2 (overall) = 0.7105 
 
Procurement Spending: 
Procurement data, divided into defense 
procurement and other agency procurement 
(other procurement) is represented by the 
value of obligations for contract actions and 
does not reflect actual government 
expenditures. Data is coded to the place of 
performance (state) rather than the location of 
the primary contractor. Excluded from this 
category are the amounts for the judicial and 
legislative branches of government as well as 
most intergovernmental transfers of funds. 
Foreign procurement spending (that is, 
spending in a foreign country as place of 
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performance) is excluded. Capital 
expenditures as well as building leases, 
utilities payment and other services are 
included. The first model in this category 
(Model 4.1) takes the natural logarithm of 
total procurement per capita as the dependent 
variable. 
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Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase in the per capita tax 
burden of $100 decreases procurement 
spending by 2%;  
- An increase of $1000 in per capita 
income increases procurement 
spending by 7.5%; 
- Alignment between the president and 
governor’s political party increases total 
procurement spending by 3.5%; 
- Alignment with the party controlling the 
House of Representatives increases 
procurement spending by 6%; 
- States with a higher population density 
receive less, while coastal states receive 
more.  
 
The total procurement spending category 
exhibits the same relationship with income 
per capita and tax burden per capita as has 
many other spending categories. In model 4.1, 
the variables of importance are alignment 
variables – between the President and a state’s 
governor, and alignment with the House 
majority. The literature shows an extensive 
focus on the role of the House of 
Representatives in discretionary spending, yet 
the results here indicate that these other 
studies may “have failed to incorporate data 
from other sources of influence at different 
levels of analysis…” and that “…predictors at 
different levels of analysis affect our 
conclusions regarding partisan effects on 
distributive politics.” (Shor 2005)  
Model 4.1: Total procurement (log of per capita amounts),  
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.0002226 0.0000195 -11.4 0 
Income per capita 7.45E-05 0.0000101 7.4 0 
GSP per capita -5.12E-06 7.00E-06 -0.73 0.464 
Voted for sitting president -0.0227638 0.0208042 -1.09 0.274 
President-governor alignment 0.0345897 0.0205444 1.68 0.092 
Senate majority alignment 0.0059279 0.0192638 0.31 0.758 
House majority alignment 0.0602979 0.0175405 3.44 0.001 
President-State Congress majority alignment 0.0334276 0.0237567 1.41 0.159 
Population density  -0.0011295 0.0003261 -3.46 0.001 
Electoral vote per capita 165869.3 87202.97 1.9 0.057 
Senators per capita 28600.22 117926.7 0.24 0.808 
Coastal state 0.3865817 0.1829957 2.11 0.035 
Constant 5.31957 0.2089126 25.46 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.2513     R2 (between) = 0.0290     R2 (overall) = 0.0009 
 
Defense Procurement:  
Disaggregating total procurement spending 
into two subgroups, we first examine federal 
defense procurement expenditures. Model 5.1 
takes the natural logarithm of defense 
procurement per capita as dependent variable. 
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Model 5.1: Defense procurement (log of per capita amounts) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.0002741 0.0000232 -11.8 0 
Income per capita 0.0000734 0.0000128 5.75 0 
GSP per capita -5.63E-06 8.73E-06 -0.65 0.519 
Voted for sitting president -0.0534968 0.0250464 -2.14 0.033 
President-governor alignment 0.0869665 0.0246185 3.53 0 
Senate majority alignment 0.0485212 0.0230064 2.11 0.035 
House majority alignment 0.0949392 0.0219298 4.33 0 
President-State Congress majority alignment 0.0404447 0.0298959 1.35 0.176 
Population density  -0.0004652 0.0004073 -1.14 0.253 
Electoral vote per capita 244266.3 107884.9 2.26 0.024 
Senators per capita -219754.4 145129.4 -1.51 0.13 
Coastal state 0.4705112 0.2383926 1.97 0.048 
Constant 4.885822 0.2521169 19.38 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.1766    R2 (between) = 0.0141     R2 (overall) = 0.0371 
 
Results include:  
- An increase in tax burden per capita of 
$100 would decrease defense 
procurement spending by 2.7%; 
- An increase in income per capita  of 
$1000 would increase defense 
procurement by 7.3%; 
- A vote for the sitting president 
decreases the amount received by 5.3%; 
- Alignment between the president and a 
state’s governor increases the amount 
received by a state by 8.7%; 
- Alignment with the Senate majority and 
the House majority shows an increase 
in federal defense procurement 
spending of 4.9% and 9.5%, 
respectively; 
- A coastal state receives 47% more 
defense procurement dollars than a 
non-coastal state. 
 
The same effects shown in the total procure-
ment spending model hold in this model, with 
political alignment and the impact of the 
president showing statistical significance all at 
the 5% level or 1% level.  
 
Other Procurement: 
Differencing the defense procurement from 
total procurement yields the category of other 
procurement spending. The first model, Model 
6.1, uses the natural logarithm of other proc-
urement spending per capita as the dependent 
variable, producing the following results: 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase of $100 in the tax burden 
per capita yields a 1% decrease in other 
procurement spending per capita; 
- An increase of $1000 in the income per 
capita yields a 6% increase in other 
procurement spending; 
- Political alignment variables are not at 
all significant, other than alignment 
with the House of Representatives 
majority, which shows a 3% decrease in 
other procurement spending per capita; 
- The variable Senators per capita, which 
shows the effect by “overrepresented” 
states, indicates that they are favored 
in other procurement spending. 
 
Once again, the same tendencies hold for 
the income per capita and the tax burden 
per capita. The majority alignment model 
yields but one statistically significant and 
negative impact on the non-defense 
procurement dollars received, which is 
alignment with the House majority. 
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Model 6.1: Other procurement (log of per capita amounts) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.0000971 0.0000227 -4.28 0 
Income per capita 0.000063 0.0000117 5.37 0 
GSP per capita 9.36E-06 9.18E-06 1.02 0.308 
Voted for sitting president 0.0187768 0.0237915 0.79 0.43 
President-governor alignment -0.0218048 0.0246648 -0.88 0.377 
Senate majority alignment -0.0203954 0.0207546 -0.98 0.326 
House majority alignment -0.0365785 0.0196383 -1.86 0.063 
President-State Congress majority alignment -0.0085568 0.0258438 -0.33 0.741 
Population density  -0.0024128 0.0004221 -5.72 0 
Electoral vote per capita -18301.22 72473.49 -0.25 0.801 
Senators per capita 422485.2 137989.9 3.06 0.002 
Coastal state 0.4286302 0.1600995 2.68 0.007 
Constant 3.831463 0.2226073 17.21 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.5234    R2 (between) = 0.0030     R2 (overall) = 0.0449 
 
Retirement and Disability Payments: 
Retirement and disability data includes federal 
employee retirement and disability benefits 
(including military and diplomatic personnel) 
and all Social Security payments. Model 7.1 
takes per capita retirement and disability 
payments as dependent variable. 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A dollar increase in the tax burden per 
capita yields a decrease of 17 cents per 
capita in retirement and disability 
spending, while a dollar increase in 
income per capita increases the amount 
Model 7.1: Retirement and Disability (per capita),  
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.1701692 0.0219628 -7.75 0 
Income per capita 1.12E-01 0.0090074 12.49 0 
GSP per capita -8.11E-03 0.0056385 -1.44 0.15 
Voted for sitting president -13.3325 24.31769 -0.55 0.584 
President-governor alignment 11.60098 18.4597 0.63 0.53 
Senate majority alignment -7.774685 17.20426 -0.45 0.651 
House majority alignment 5.808874 18.05438 0.32 0.748 
President-State Congress majority alignment 15.91784 24.85702 0.64 0.522 
Population density  -0.7141251 0.1329107 -5.37 0 
Electoral vote per capita 1.07E+08 4.68E+07 2.28 0.023 
Senators per capita -6.62E+07 5.09E+07 -1.3 0.193 
Coastal state 83.37106 53.51849 1.56 0.119 
Constant 14.66442 117.6832 0.12 0.901 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.7482    R2 (between) = 0.1061     R2 (overall) = 0.5546 
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Model 8.1: Other Payments, 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Tax burden per capita -0.1162946 0.0192389 -6.04 0 
Income per capita 1.02E-01 0.0067278 15.09 0 
GSP per capita -9.31E-03 0.0044321 -2.1 0.036 
Voted for sitting president -44.17144 17.78916 -2.48 0.013 
President-governor alignment 11.0443 16.9816 0.65 0.515 
Senate majority alignment -9.73557 17.85796 -0.55 0.586 
House majority alignment -11.67391 15.92125 -0.73 0.463 
President-State Congress majority alignment 80.61363 20.56637 3.92 0 
Population density  -0.4287709 0.1244383 -3.45 0.001 
Electoral vote per capita -2.45E+07 4.69E+07 -0.52 0.602 
Senators per capita 8.55E+07 5.87E+07 1.46 0.145 
Coastal state 37.5652 38.30657 0.98 0.327 
Constant -448.9418 122.6501 -3.66 0 
 
Observations = 966; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 21 
R2 (within) = 0.8169    R2 (between) = 0.0001     R2 (overall) = 0.6445 
received by 11 cents; 
- There is no significant political effect 
observed on the allocation of retirement 
and disability spending to the states; 
- States with a higher population density 
receive less than states with a lower 
population density. 
 
It is logical that retirement and disability 
payments to the states do not seem to be 
politically influenced, as both these payments 
are largely formula based. A state with a 
greater population density could conceivably 
provide the same level of service in a state 
with lower population density by taking 
advantage of the economies of scale offered by 
a more urbanized population.  
 
Other Payments: 
The spending category “Other Payments” 
includes other direct payments to individuals 
other than retirement and disability and direct 
payments that are not for individuals. The 
former category includes excess earned 
income tax credit payments, payments to state 
unemployment trust funds, and interest 
subsidies for family education loans. The 
latter category includes the administration 
costs of the federal family education loan 
program, crop insurance indemnity payments 
and crop subsidies, all non-procurement and 
non-salary postal service expenditures, federal 
contributions to employee life and health 
insurance programs, along with other smaller 
programs of a similar nature.  Model 8.1 uses 
other payments in per-capita terms as 
dependent variable: 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A dollar increase in income per capita 
increases other payments by 10 cents, 
while a dollar increase in per capita tax 
burden decreases other payments by 12 
cents; 
- A vote for the sitting president reduces 
the per-capita other payments to states 
by $44 dollars; 
- Alignment between the sitting  
president and the controlling party of 
the state’s Congress increases other 
payments to the state by $81 dollars 
per capita; 
- More densely populated states receive 
less than sparsely populated states. 
 
Although other payments to states can include 
more pork-barrel type spending items, a look 
at the majority alignment model shows the 
determinants to be largely geographic and 
economic. The variable showing party 
alignment between the controlling party of a 
 21 
 Notes & Analyses #17  January 2007 
Model 1.2: Total expenditures (total dollars),  
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 2990.007 490.2887 6.1 0 
Population2 0.0000811 0.0000157 5.16 0 
Tax burden per capita -2492114 647042.1 -3.85 0 
Income per capita 1577879 201559.4 7.83 0 
Electoral vote per capita 3.44E+15 1.16E+15 2.97 0.003 
Senators per capita -3.10E+15 1.52E+15 -2.04 0.041 
GSP per capita -78557.1 160120.7 -0.49 0.624 
Population density -1393213 2740475 -0.51 0.611 
Voted for Republican sitting president -7.84E+08 5.05E+08 -1.55 0.121 
Voted for Democrat sitting president 7.68E+07 4.91E+08 0.16 0.876 
Republican governor 3.24E+09 5.86E+08 5.54 0 
Democrat governor 2.76E+09 6.26E+08 4.41 0 
Senators both Republican 1.57E+09 4.66E+08 3.38 0.001 
Senators both Democrat 3.82E+08 6.64E+08 0.58 0.565 
Representatives majority Republican -3.02E+08 5.69E+08 -0.53 0.595 
Representatives majority Democrat -2.70E+09 5.52E+08 -4.88 0 
State Senate majority Republican -3.95E+08 8.21E+08 -0.48 0.631 
State Senate majority Democrat -1.21E+09 8.06E+08 -1.5 0.135 
State House majority Republican 1.52E+09 7.71E+08 1.98 0.048 
State House majority Democrat -6.46E+07 7.51E+08 -0.09 0.931 
Swing State 2667540 5.75E+08 0 0.996 
Coastal 9.75E+08 1.12E+09 0.87 0.383 
Constant -2.43E+10 3.56E+09 -6.83 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.8136     R2 (between) = 0.9641     R2 (overall) = 0.9363 
state’s Congress and the president, which is 
new to the literature, is significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Pure party affiliation on 
federal and state levels is an important 
determinant for certain federal spending 
categories 
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In this section, we will model the dependent 
variables in total dollar terms. The choice is 
rather arbitrary, as the literature shows 
transfers in a partisan model modeled as 
percentage of total budget (Budge and 
Hofferbert, 1990) or in total dollar terms 
(Levitt and Snyder, 1995). We have chosen the 
latter method, with a logarithmic 
transformation in procurement and defense-
related categories.  
 
Total expenditures:  
This is the aggregate of all government spend-
ing and obligations. We again use a random-
effects8 GLS model with robust standard 
errors, taking total expenditures in dollar 
amounts as dependent variable (Model 1.2).  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A dollar increase in per capita tax 
burden decreases a state’s total federal 
expenditures by $2.4 million; 
- An dollar increase in per capita income 
increases the amount received by the 
state by $1.5 million;  
 
8 The random-effects model (for this model and all 
subsequent models) was chosen using a Hausman test 
for random-effects specification, as we did for the 
previous subsection.   
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Model 2.2: Defense Expenditures (logarithm of total dollars) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
Population 1.29E-07 1.58E-08 8.19 0 
Population2 -2.51E-15 3.33E-16 -7.54 0 
Tax burden per capita -0.00015 0.0000189 -7.94 0 
Income per capita 0.0000434 8.06E-06 5.39 0 
Electoral vote per capita 165038.9 65697.8 2.51 0.012 
Senators per capita -660543.2 99880.54 -6.61 0 
GSP per capita 2.80E-06 5.12E-06 0.55 0.584 
Population density -0.0011689 0.0003106 -3.76 0 
Voted for Republican sitting president 0.0289684 0.0165605 1.75 0.08 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -0.0780872 0.0195658 -3.99 0 
Republican governor 0.1136302 0.0510719 2.22 0.026 
Senators both Republican 0.1310102 0.0517908 2.53 0.011 
Democrat governor 0.0520171 0.0205373 2.53 0.011 
Senators both Democrat -0.0015471 0.0198169 -0.08 0.938 
Representatives majority Republican 0.0503117 0.0250774 2.01 0.045 
Representatives majority Democrat 0.0466752 0.0222688 2.1 0.036 
State Senate majority Republican 0.1563138 0.0424886 3.68 0 
State Senate majority Democrat 0.0737653 0.0421392 1.75 0.08 
State House majority Republican 0.0199451 0.0539783 0.37 0.712 
State House majority Democrat -0.0127545 0.0512448 -0.25 0.803 
Swing State -0.033701 0.017217 -1.96 0.05 
Coastal 0.5044113 0.2350721 2.15 0.032 
Constant 20.52511 0.1935294 106 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.4395     R2 (between) = 0.7825   R2 (overall) = 0.7687 
- A Republican governor receives $480 
million more than a Democrat 
counterpart; 
- Representatives that are in majority 
Democrat bring $2.7 billion less than a 
split or majority Republican House 
delegation; 
- A State House of Representatives that is 
majority Republican indicates $1.52 
billion more in total federal 
expenditures.  
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Results concerning the allocation of total 
spending determined by pure party alignment 
model are not particularly noteworthy, beyond 
the economic, population and geographic 
effects similarly captured in the majority 
alignment model. Notably, having a State’s 
two members of the Senate aligned with the 
Republican Party has a significant positive 
impact on the total funds received by the 
State. A majority of Democrat Representatives 
yield a significant negative impact on the total 
federal funds received by the state. In the 
aggregate of federal expenditures, it is the 
federal legislative branch that seems to have 
the most impact.  
 
Defense Expenditures: 
Defense expenditures are computed by 
totaling the expenditures for all Department of 
Defense agencies. Model 2.2 takes the natural 
logarithm9 of total defense expenditures as the 
dependent variable: 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase of $100 in per capita tax 
burden decreases total defense 
expenditures by 1.5%; 
 
9 Following precedent in Shor (2005) 
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- An increase of $1000 in per capita 
income increases defense expenditures 
by 4%; 
- An increase of $1000 in GSP per capita 
increases defense expenditures by 
2.8%; 
- Voting for the sitting Republican 
president decreases expenditures by 
3%; 
- Voting for the sitting Democrat 
president decreases expenditures by 
7.8%; 
- Party alignment between the president 
and the governor increases federal 
defense spending in the state by 6.4%, 
while party alignment between the 
president and the state legislative 
branch increases defense spending by 
3.3%; 
- Delegates to the House of Representa-
tives aligned with the Republicans 
receive 0.5% more than representatives 
aligned with the Democrats; 
- Less densely populated states receive 
more than higher-density states;  
- Coastal states receive 50% more in 
defense spending than non-coastal 
states. 
 
Similar results were obtained in this model 
(compared to the majority alignment model 
2.1) with the results for the effects of common 
explanatory variables. This model, a party 
alignment model of defense expenditures, 
reveals that a vote for a Republican president 
has a very significant impact on defense-
allocated expenditures to a state whereas a 
state that voted for a Democratic president 
would see a statistically significant drop. A 
very similar effect is observed with the party 
alignment of a state’s two senators, with a 
positive impact for Republican alignment 
compared with senators split between the two 
parties or two Democratic senators. This 
result could reflect the spending priorities of 
the parties during this time period 
encompassing the end of the Cold War and 
the beginning of early 21st century 
neoconservative military interventions and an 
increase in security related spending. This will 
be discussed in greater depth in the following 
section.  
 
Grants Awarded:  
The regression on total dollars of grants 
awarded yields Model 3.2: 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A state receives $440,000 more in 
grants with a dollar increase in per-
capita income; 
- A state collects $890,000 less in grants 
per dollar of per capita tax burden; 
- A Republican governor brings $207 
million more than a Democrat governor; 
- Two Democrat senators bring $70 
million more than two Republican 
senators, and $452 million more than a 
split senate delegation; 
- More densely populated states receive 
more in total dollars than states with a 
lower population density;  
- Coastal states receive $656 million less 
in total dollars than landlocked states.  
 
Population is not a significant variable in this 
category of spending. Although many grants 
are formula based, project-based block grants 
are also included in this category, which are 
largely determined by the infrastructure needs 
of a state, an to a certain extent, by pork 
barrel politics, and could thus mitigate the 
effects of a state’s population. The tax burden 
per capita is significant, indicating once again 
a transfer from the richer-income states to the 
lower-income states, although the increase in 
income would mitigate the effect of the 
increased taxes10. This party alignment model 
shows that Senators aligned with either party 
have a positive impact on the grants awarded 
to their home state. On the other side of 
Capitol Hill, in the House of Representatives, 
the party alignment variables show a negative 
impact in grants allocated, indicating that a 
split delegation would receive more in grants 
allocated to the state.   
 
10 Assume that a $100 increase in per capita income 
increases the per capita tax burden by $30. All other 
things equal, the net increase in total grants received 
would be (100*440,000)-(30*890,000)= $18.3 million. 
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Model 3.2: Grants awarded (total dollars), 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 63.08007 203.9006 0.31 0.757 
Population2 0.0000399 5.96E-06 6.69 0 
Tax burden per capita -893806 214832.3 -4.16 0 
Income per capita 444688.1 64339.14 6.91 0 
Electoral vote per capita 6.64E+14 3.35E+14 1.99 0.047 
Senators per capita -3.47E+14 5.33E+14 -0.65 0.514 
GSP per capita 18547.63 57137.26 0.32 0.745 
Population density 1839943 1051242 1.75 0.08 
Voted for Republican sitting president -2.21E+08 1.70E+08 -1.3 0.195 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -1.35E+08 1.94E+08 -0.7 0.486 
Republican governor 7.89E+08 1.86E+08 4.25 0 
Democrat governor 5.82E+08 1.96E+08 2.97 0.003 
Senators both Republican 3.82E+08 1.26E+08 3.03 0.002 
Senators both Democrat 4.52E+08 2.90E+08 1.56 0.118 
Representatives majority Republican -2.91E+08 1.47E+08 -1.98 0.048 
Representatives majority Democrat -5.77E+08 1.38E+08 -4.17 0 
State Senate majority Republican -4.02E+07 2.08E+08 -0.19 0.847 
State Senate majority Democrat -1.56E+08 2.04E+08 -0.76 0.445 
State House majority Republican 3.25E+08 2.34E+08 1.39 0.164 
State House majority Democrat 6.30E+07 2.20E+08 0.29 0.774 
Swing State -1.34E+08 1.78E+08 -0.75 0.452 
Coastal -6.56E+08 3.98E+08 -1.65 0.099 
Constant -6.03E+09 1.29E+09 -4.66 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.7395    R2 (between) = 0.8124     R2 (overall) = 0.7722 
Procurement Spending: 
Procurement data is divided into defense 
procurement and other agency procurement. 
We will first examine this category in its 
aggregate. Model 4.2 takes the natural 
logarithm of total procurement dollars to a 
state as the dependent variable:  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase in the per capita tax 
burden of $100 decreases procurement 
spending by 2%;  
- An increase of $1000 in per capita 
income increases procurement 
spending by 7.5%; 
- A state that voted for the sitting 
Democrat president would receive 6.9% 
less procurement spending, while a 
state that voted for the sitting 
Republican president would receive 
4.4% more; 
- A Democrat governor secures 2% more 
in procurement spending than a 
Republican; 
- Alignment with the Republican Party in 
the Senate and the House of 
Representatives increases procurement 
spending by 5% and 6.7%, respectively; 
- A State Senate controlled by the 
Republican Party increases 
procurement spending by 6%; 
- States with a higher population density 
receive less, while coastal states receive 
more.  
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Model 4.2: Total procurement (log of total dollars),  
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 1.52E-07 1.99E-08 7.61 0 
Population2 -3.01E-15 4.35E-16 -6.92 0 
Tax burden per capita -0.0001723 0.0000243 -7.09 0 
Income per capita 0.0000757 0.0000109 6.92 0 
Electoral vote per capita 148930.4 89947 1.66 0.098 
Senators per capita -479749.9 135018.1 -3.55 0 
GSP per capita -0.0000132 7.16E-06 -1.84 0.066 
Population density -0.0014491 0.0003756 -3.86 0 
Voted for Republican sitting president 0.0448229 0.0204751 2.19 0.029 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -0.0688157 0.0253746 -2.71 0.007 
Republican governor 0.1786423 0.0561854 3.18 0.001 
Democrat governor 0.199523 0.0573112 3.48 0 
Senators both Republican 0.0501997 0.0275168 1.82 0.068 
Senators both Democrat 0.0162227 0.028652 0.57 0.571 
Representatives majority Republican 0.0670286 0.031615 2.12 0.034 
Representatives majority Democrat 0.0195326 0.0302592 0.65 0.519 
State Senate majority Republican 0.1352461 0.0587794 2.3 0.021 
State Senate majority Democrat 0.0597323 0.0577964 1.03 0.301 
State House majority Republican 0.0587379 0.0623499 0.94 0.346 
State House majority Democrat 0.0095875 0.0592178 0.16 0.871 
Swing State -0.0396704 0.0238295 -1.66 0.096 
Coastal 0.4256061 0.2508402 1.7 0.09 
Constant 19.91405 0.2596142 76.71 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.4051    R2 (between) = 0.7211     R2 (overall) = 0.6991 
Population naturally is a significant variable, 
but less so when compared with more formula 
driven federal transfers (such as retirement 
and disability spending). Model 4.2 shows 
once again a sharp contrast in procurement 
spending obtained by a state in respect to the 
pure party alignment with the President. 
States that voted for a Democratic president in 
office experience a negative impact on the 
procurement funds received, whilst the 
opposite effect is observed for states voting for 
a Republican president in office. Alignment 
with the Republican Party in both chambers of 
Congress shows a statistically significant 
payoff for the states. 
 
Defense Procurement: 
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The amount of defense procurement spending 
received by states varies greatly, thus the 
dependent variable in this party politics model 
is the natural log of total defense procurement 
(Model 5.2).  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- A $100 increase in the per-capita tax 
burden of would decrease defense 
procurement spending by 2%; 
- An increase in income per capita  of 
$1000 would increase defense 
procurement by 6.5%; 
- A vote for the Republican sitting 
president increases the amount 
received by 8%, while a vote for the 
Democrat sitting president decreases 
the amount received by 14%; 
- A Republican governor receives 1% less 
than a Democrat governor; 
- Alignment with the Senate Republicans 
obtains 12% more in federal defense 
 Notes & Analyses #17  January 2007 
Model 5.2: Defense procurement (log of total dollars), 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>|z| 
Population 1.38E-07 2.36E-08 5.87 0 
Population2 -2.75E-15 5.07E-16 -5.43 0 
Tax burden per capita -0.0001802 0.0000296 -6.1 0 
Income per capita 0.0000654 0.0000142 4.62 0 
Electoral vote per capita 214238.5 115393.7 1.86 0.063 
Senators per capita -815405 171608.9 -4.75 0 
GSP per capita -0.0000135 9.11E-06 -1.48 0.139 
Population density -0.0007083 0.0004378 -1.62 0.106 
Voted for Republican sitting president 0.079833 0.0259467 3.08 0.002 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -0.1434677 0.0330835 -4.34 0 
Republican governor 0.1644748 0.0698009 2.36 0.018 
Democrat governor 0.1743239 0.0701872 2.48 0.013 
Senators both Republican 0.1258597 0.0351279 3.58 0 
Senators both Democrat 0.032765 0.0330572 0.99 0.322 
Representatives majority Republican 0.1285109 0.0393571 3.27 0.001 
Representatives majority Democrat 0.0693611 0.0377429 1.84 0.066 
State Senate majority Republican 0.190191 0.0609494 3.12 0.002 
State Senate majority Democrat 0.0684656 0.0604761 1.13 0.258 
State House majority Republican 0.0307606 0.0642172 0.48 0.632 
State House majority Democrat -0.009664 0.0598982 -0.16 0.872 
Swing State -0.0424885 0.0281395 -1.51 0.131 
Coastal 0.5057828 0.3026987 1.67 0.095 
Constant 19.60839 0.3117529 62.9 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.2835    R2 (between) = 0.7478     R2 (overall) = 0.7203 
procurement spending, while a state’s 
House delegation aligned with the 
Republicans receives 6% more than a 
House delegation aligned with the 
Democrats; 
- A coastal state receives 50% more 
defense procurement dollars than a 
non-coastal state. 
 
The same effects shown in total procurement 
spending hold in this model, and 
approximately the same percentage effects are 
observed when compared with model 5.1. 
Political effects are strikingly partisan, with 
states receiving high amounts of defense 
procurement contracts electing Republicans 
into office on the federal level. The geographic 
need for increased defense spending on the 
coasts is also reflected in the results of this 
model. 
Other Procurement: 
The other subcategory of procurement spend-
ing incorporates all non-defense procurement 
contracts. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of other procurement dollars sent 
to the state (Model 6.2).  
 
Some important results of Model 6.2 are 
summarized below:  
- An increase of $100 in the tax burden 
per capita yields a 1% decrease in other 
procurement spending per capita; 
- An increase of $1000 in the income per 
capita yields a 7.8% increase in other 
procurement spending; 
- The significant political variables 
include a vote for a Democrat president, 
which brings 5% more in other 
procurement spending, while having 
 27 
 Notes & Analyses #17  January 2007 
Model 6.2: Other procurement (log of total dollars) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 1.72E-07 2.42E-08 7.09 0 
Population2 -3.23E-15 4.61E-16 -7.02 0 
Tax burden per capita -0.0001314 0.0000281 -4.68 0 
Income per capita 0.0000788 0.0000124 6.36 0 
Electoral vote per capita -5909.447 72628.79 -0.08 0.935 
Senators per capita 36924.4 138566.6 0.27 0.79 
GSP per capita 3.78E-06 9.12E-06 0.41 0.679 
Population density -0.0024475 0.0004607 -5.31 0 
Voted for Republican sitting president -0.028934 0.0242767 -1.19 0.233 
Voted for Democrat sitting president 0.0517971 0.0257118 2.01 0.044 
Republican governor 0.0122216 0.0550199 0.22 0.824 
Democrat governor 0.0245577 0.0575562 0.43 0.67 
Senators both Republican -0.0749971 0.0308384 -2.43 0.015 
Senators both Democrat -0.0027997 0.0330974 -0.08 0.933 
Representatives majority Republican -0.0319727 0.0355713 -0.9 0.369 
Representatives majority Democrat -0.0263735 0.0345534 -0.76 0.445 
State Senate majority Republican -0.006446 0.059367 -0.11 0.914 
State Senate majority Democrat -0.0113264 0.06053 -0.19 0.852 
State House majority Republican -0.0223716 0.0749483 -0.3 0.765 
State House majority Democrat 0.0344515 0.0707494 0.49 0.626 
Swing State -0.0334847 0.0272686 -1.23 0.219 
Coastal 0.4707426 0.1613209 2.92 0.004 
Constant 18.43333 0.2710489 68.01 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.6314    R2 (between) = 0.4411     R2 (overall) = 0.4598 
two Republican senators decreases 
procurement spending by 7.5%;   
- A coastal state receives 47% more in 
procurement spending than a non-
coastal state.  
 
Once again, the same tendencies hold for 
income per capita and tax burden per capita, 
similar to the effects observed in model 6.1. 
The pure party alignment model shows but 
two significant political variables in the execu-
tive branch at the federal and state levels.  
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Model 7.2: Retirement and Disability (total dollars) 
46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 1250.511 197.1199 6.34 0 
Population2 0.0000135 6.14E-06 2.2 0.028 
Tax burden per capita -410598.1 245416.7 -1.67 0.094 
Income per capita 539355.8 70480.7 7.65 0 
Electoral vote per capita 1.09E+15 3.89E+14 2.8 0.005 
Senators per capita -9.10E+14 5.27E+14 -1.73 0.085 
GSP per capita -108242.9 53423.07 -2.03 0.043 
Population density -462846.9 1213580 -0.38 0.703 
Voted for Republican sitting president 1.08E+08 2.05E+08 0.53 0.598 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -2.85E+08 2.67E+08 -1.07 0.285 
Republican governor 7.36E+08 2.28E+08 3.23 0.001 
Democrat governor 7.65E+08 2.53E+08 3.03 0.002 
Senators both Republican 3.52E+08 2.09E+08 1.69 0.092 
Senators both Democrat 1.24E+08 2.86E+08 0.43 0.664 
Representatives majority Republican -5482342 2.18E+08 -0.03 0.98 
Representatives majority Democrat -8.29E+08 2.11E+08 -3.93 0 
State Senate majority Republican -3.58E+08 3.50E+08 -1.02 0.307 
State Senate majority Democrat -5.02E+08 3.10E+08 -1.62 0.105 
State House majority Republican 7.04E+08 5.19E+08 1.36 0.175 
State House majority Democrat 9.59E+07 4.92E+08 0.19 0.845 
Swing State 3.59E+08 2.57E+08 1.4 0.163 
Coastal -9.86E+07 5.32E+08 -0.19 0.853 
Constant -8.41E+09 1.38E+09 -6.08 0 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.6957    R2 (between) = 0.9304     R2 (overall) = 0.8833 
Retirement and Disability: 
Model 7.2 takes the annual dollar amount of 
retirement and disability payments to 
individuals as the dependent variable.  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- An increase in income per capita by one 
dollar increases the amount received by 
$540,000; 
- An increase in tax burden per capita by 
one dollar decreases the amount 
received by $463,000; 
- Republican governors receive $29 
million less than Democrats, and two 
Republican senators bring $228 million 
more than an all-Democrat or 
bipartisan Senate delegation. 
 
Retirement and disability payments are 
undoubtedly determined in large part by 
population and economic variables; however 
this model suggests that Democrat governors 
and Republican senators bring more in such 
payments to their states.  
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Model 8.2: Other Payments, 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Population 399.3192 177.0287 2.26 0.024 
Population2 0.000029 4.64E-06 6.26 0 
Tax burden per capita -595906.2 225423.9 -2.64 0.008 
Income per capita 579986.7 66538.25 8.72 0 
Electoral vote per capita 1.13E+15 3.85E+14 2.92 0.004 
Senators per capita -1.06E+15 5.22E+14 -2.03 0.042 
GSP per capita -131042.9 45291.45 -2.89 0.004 
Population density 1439482 948917.6 1.52 0.129 
Voted for Republican sitting president -5.85E+08 1.81E+08 -3.23 0.001 
Voted for Democrat sitting president 2.20E+08 1.91E+08 1.15 0.25 
Republican governor 6.62E+08 2.32E+08 2.85 0.004 
Democrat governor 5.69E+08 2.48E+08 2.29 0.022 
Senators both Republican 2.37E+08 1.67E+08 1.42 0.155 
Senators both Democrat 1.79E+08 2.36E+08 0.76 0.448 
Representatives majority Republican 2.44E+07 1.90E+08 0.13 0.898 
Representatives majority Democrat -8.93E+08 1.77E+08 -5.04 0 
State Senate majority Republican -8.73E+07 3.19E+08 -0.27 0.784 
State Senate majority Democrat -6.00E+08 3.04E+08 -1.98 0.048 
State House majority Republican 6.10E+08 3.12E+08 1.96 0.05 
State House majority Democrat 5.64E+07 3.00E+08 0.19 0.851 
Swing State -3.79E+07 2.17E+08 -0.17 0.861 
Coastal -6.02E+08 3.96E+08 -1.52 0.129 
Constant -7.05E+09 1.24E+09 -5.68 0 
 
Observations = 966; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 21 
R2 (within) = 0.7789    R2 (between) = 0.8874     R2 (overall) = 0.8360 
Other Payments: 
Model 8.2 takes the annual dollar amount of 
other payments as dependent variable.  
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- Population is a significant determinant 
of other payments received by the 
states, with $400 dollars per person;  
- A dollar increase in per capita tax 
burden decreases the amount received 
by $596,000, while a dollar increase in 
GSP per capita decreases the amount 
received  by $131,000; 
- A dollar increase in per capita income 
increases the amount received by 
$580,000;  
- Important political determinants show 
that a vote for the Republican sitting 
president decreases the amount 
received by $585 million, while a 
Republican governor brings slightly 
more in other payments than a 
Democrat counterpart; 
- A majority Democrat House of 
Representatives delegation brings $893 
million less in other payments to their 
home state. 
 
In the preceding models, population again is a 
very significant determinant in the “other 
payments” received by a state. Economic 
variables are significant, all at the 1% level. 
Taking a look at the other model, a vote for a 
Republican president will adversely impact a 
state’s other payments whereas a vote for a 
Democrat president has no significant impact. 
A state that elects more Republicans to the 
House of Representatives elicits no 
statistically significant impact whereas there 
is a strong negative impact where the 
Representatives are mostly Democrat.  
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Model 9.1: Net Fiscal Benefit (per capita), 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Income per capita 0.0564391 0.0280832 2.01 0.044 
GSP per capita -0.0639696 0.0210618 -3.04 0.002 
Population density -3.2228 0.6818505 -4.73 0 
Electoral vote per capita -3.17E+08 1.37E+08 -2.31 0.021 
Senators per capita 5.44E+08 1.51E+08 3.6 0 
Voted for sitting president -143.2136 79.26503 -1.81 0.071 
President-governor alignment 141.2554 62.67475 2.25 0.024 
Senate majority alignment 36.34161 56.76428 0.64 0.522 
House majority alignment 150.3832 57.53988 2.61 0.009 
President-State Congress majority alignment 279.6451 81.22469 3.44 0.001 
Coastal 251.3909 192.9586 1.3 0.193 
Swing State -28.98518 67.62442 -0.43 0.668 
Constant 1216.27 385.2238 3.16 0.002 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.0648    R2 (between) = 0.3720     R2 (overall) = 0.2772 
Hypothesis 3: The net fiscal benefit per 
capita can be allocated according to a 
majority alignment model or political party 
alignment model.  
 
Net Fiscal Benefit: 
Finally, the net fiscal benefit is defined as the 
amount of public services received minus the 
amount of taxes paid. This was calculated 
using the Tax Foundation data as a baseline, 
distributing the federal deficit and allowing for 
some shifting of corporate taxes.  The net 
fiscal benefit uses total expenditures as the 
amount of public services delivered. Excluding 
Hawaii, Alaska, Maryland, Virginia and 
Washington D.C. from the data facilitates 
comparison as many of the expenditures 
would have otherwise be considered public 
goods provided, in some part, to the country 
as a whole.  
 
The model differs from others in that the net 
fiscal benefit is modeled in per capita terms, 
for both models, as there is no precedent for a 
dependent variable of this kind. A regression 
with net fiscal benefit per capita as dependent 
variable is shown in Model 9.1. 
 
 
 
Some important results are summarized 
below:  
- For every dollar increase in per capita 
income, a state receives 5 cents in net 
fiscal benefit per capita; 
- For every dollar increase in per capita 
GSP, a state receives 6 cents less in net 
fiscal benefit; 
- As population density increases, a state 
receives less; 
- The alignment between the president 
and governor procures $141 more in 
net fiscal benefit per capita; 
- State delegates to the House of 
Representatives aligned with the 
majority party bring $151 more to the 
state in per capita terms; 
- Alignment between the President’s 
party and the majority party of the 
state’s congress brings $280 more per 
capita.  
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Model 9.2: Net Fiscal Benefit (per capita), 46 American States, 1983-2004 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 
Income per capita 0.0618913 0.0242216 2.56 0.011 
GSP per capita -0.0514396 0.0178969 -2.87 0.004 
Population density -3.13219 0.6437139 -4.87 0 
Electoral vote per capita -4.70E+08 1.29E+08 -3.63 0 
Senators per capita 6.22E+08 1.49E+08 4.17 0 
Voted for Republican sitting president 400.92 68.5623 5.85 0 
Voted for Democrat sitting president -523.9599 83.60368 -6.27 0 
Republican governor 97.92472 231.9291 0.42 0.673 
Democrat governor 235.9959 235.9239 1 0.317 
Senators both Republican  203.3257 70.7438 2.87 0.004 
Senators both Democrat -31.79896 77.00082 -0.41 0.68 
Representatives majority Republican 40.17641 86.45073 0.46 0.642 
Representatives majority Democrat -159.1465 91.34947 -1.74 0.081 
State Senate majority Republican 621.8487 151.9282 4.09 0 
State Senate majority Democrat 544.5415 150.2732 3.62 0 
State House majority Republican 217.9445 206.6197 1.05 0.292 
State House majority Democrat 141.2313 208.8971 0.68 0.499 
Swing State -9.724132 66.49566 -0.15 0.884 
Coastal 246.093 186.7182 1.32 0.188 
Constant 229.4418 546.0252 0.42 0.674 
 
Observations = 1012; Groups = 46; Observations per group = 22 
R2 (within) = 0.2457    R2 (between) = 0.2614     R2 (overall) = 0.2537 
Some important results of Model 9.2 are 
summarized below: 
- For every dollar increase in per capita 
income, a state receives 6 cents in net 
fiscal benefit per capita; 
- For every dollar increase in per capita 
GSP, a state receives 5 cents less in net 
fiscal benefit; 
- As population density increases, a state 
receives less per person; 
- A vote for the Republican sitting 
president procures $401 in net fiscal 
benefit per capita, while a vote for the 
Democrat sitting president yields $524 
less in net fiscal benefit per capita; 
- Two Republican senators bring $203 
more per capita than a split or all-
Democrat Senate delegation; 
- A majority of a state’s representatives to 
the House aligned with the Democratic 
Party brings $173 less per capita than 
a split or majority Republican 
delegation; 
- Alignment between the President’s 
party and the majority party of the 
state’s congress brings $280 more per 
capita.  
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Table 6: Summary of Majority Alignment Model Results 
 
Dependent Variable ($ per capita) 
Federal 
expenditures 
Defense 
expenditures* Grants awarded 
Retirement and 
disability Net fiscal benefit 
  (H1) (H1) (H1) (H1) (H3) 
Tax burden per 
capita 
-0.5424816 
(-11.6) 
-0.000194 
(-12.9) 
-0.2217028 
(-14.3) 
-0.1701692 
(-7.75) 
N/A 
Income per capita 
0.325597 
(17.09) 
0.000041 
(5.75) 
0.1125848 
(21.37) 
0.112464 
(12.49) 
0.0564391 
(2.01) 
GSP per capita 
0.0030378 
(0.23) 
0.000011 
(2.28) 
-0.0043025 
(-1.26) 
-0.0081117 
(-1.44) 
-0.0639696 
(-3.04) 
Voted for sitting 
president 
-113.0688 
(-2.86) 
-0.0500139 
(-3.09) 
-21.34326 
(-1.57) 
-13.3325 
(-0.55) 
-143.2136 
(-1.81) 
President-governor 
alignment 
52.74592 
(1.47) 
0.0641802 
 (4.48) 
-2.091315 
(-0.19) 
11.60098 
(0.63) 
141.2554 
(2.25) 
Senate majority 
alignment 
0.198546 
(0.01) 
0.0102201 
(0.72) 
-0.6338944 
(-0.06) 
-7.774685 
(-0.45) 
36.34161 
(0.64) 
House majority 
alignment 
41.3899 
(1.25) 
0.052483 
(3.93) 
-4.433571 
(-0.38) 
5.808874 
(0.32) 
150.3832 
(2.61) 
President-State 
Congress majority 
alignment 
204.8054 
(4.62) 
0.0331966 
(1.9) 
58.19225 
(4.31) 
15.91784 
(0.64) 
279.6451 
(3.44) 
* Natural log of per capita defense expenditures (coefficient x 100 = % change) 
** Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics  
Summary of Empirical Results and Political 
Analysis:  
 
The empirical results reveal and confirm many 
of the results in earlier literature, and often 
confirm the stated public policy objectives of 
American political parties. The pure partisan 
politics model revealed that Republicans are 
more likely to reward their base. The model 
shows a more Democratic inclination towards 
“capturing the middle,” as there is a 
significant negative effect with the funds 
allocated to states that voted Democrat Bill 
Clinton into office in all procurement spending 
categories, defense expenditures and 
retirement and disability payments. States 
that send a majority of Democrats as House 
Representatives also see a negative impact on 
their finances in the categories of grants 
awarded, defense procurement spending and 
defense expenditures, whereas states 
represented by a majority Republican House 
contingent are favorably financed in defense 
expenditures and the subcategory of defense 
procurement.  
 
Nonetheless the evidence for politically-
motivated redistribution in formula-based, 
low-variation programs such as payments for 
retirement and disability and other payments 
to individuals is minimal. The programmatic 
redistribution reflects “prevailing ideological 
beliefs about equality” and the amounts tend 
to “change only when there is a major 
ideological shift in the population.” The seeds 
for such a shift were sown with the fallout 
from the Democrat-sponsored Civil Rights Act; 
President Johnson aptly predicted that the 
Democrats had “lost the South for a 
generation.” The Republicans became the 
party of the American South, swelling and 
expanding with the neoconservative shift that 
occurred in the early 1980s.  
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Table 7: Summary of Political Party Alignment Model Results 
 
Dependent Variable (total dollars) 
Federal 
expenditures 
Defense 
expenditures* Grants awarded 
Retirement and 
disability 
Net fiscal 
benefit** 
   (H1) (H1) (H1) (H1) (H3) 
Tax burden per 
capita 
-2492114 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.00015 
(-7.94) 
-893806 
(-4.16) 
-410598.1 
(-1.67) 
N/A 
Income per capita 
1577879 
(7.83) 
0.0000434 
(5.39) 
444688.1 
(6.91) 
539355.8 
(7.65) 
0.0618913 
(2.56) 
GSP per capita 
-78557.1 
(-2.04) 
0.0000028 
(0.55) 
18547.63 
(0.32) 
-108243 
(-2.03) 
-0.0514396 
(-2.87) 
Voted for 
Republican sitting 
president 
-784000000 
(-1.55) 
0.0289684 
(1.75) 
-221000000 
(-1.3) 
108000000 
(0.53) 
400.92 
(5.85) 
Voted for Democrat 
sitting president 
76800000 
(0.16) 
-0.0780872 
(-3.99) 
-135000000 
(-0.7) 
-285000000 
(-1.07) 
-523.9599 
(-6.27) 
Republican 
governor 
3240000000 
(5.54) 
0.1136302 
(2.22) 
789000000 
(4.25) 
736000000 
(3.23) 
97.92472 
(0.42) 
Democrat governor 
2760000000 
(4.41) 
0.1310102 
(2.53) 
582000000 
(2.97) 
765000000 
(3.03) 
235.9959 
(1) 
Senators both 
Republican  
1570000000 
(3.38) 
0.0520171 
(2.53) 
382000000 
(3.03) 
352000000 
(1.69) 
203.3257 
(2.87) 
Senators both 
Democrat 
382000000 
(0.58) 
-0.0015471 
(-0.08) 
452000000 
(1.56) 
124000000 
(0.43) 
-31.79896 
(-0.41) 
Representatives 
majority Republican 
-302000000 
(-0.53) 
0.0503117 
(2.01) 
-291000000 
(-1.98) 
-5482342 
(-0.03) 
40.17641 
(0.46) 
Representatives 
majority Democrat 
-2700000000 
(-4.88) 
0.0466752 
(2.1) 
-577000000 
(-4.17) 
-829000000 
(-3.93) 
-159.1465 
(-1.74) 
State Senate 
majority Republican 
-395000000 
(-0.48) 
0.1563138 
(3.68) 
-40200000 
(-0.19) 
-358000000 
(-1.02) 
621.8487 
(4.09) 
State Senate 
majority Democrat 
-1210000000 
(-1.5) 
0.0737653 
(1.75) 
-156000000 
(-0.76) 
-502000000 
(-1.62) 
544.5415 
(3.62) 
State House 
majority Republican 
1520000000 
(1.98) 
0.0199451 
(0.37) 
325000000 
(1.39) 
704000000 
(1.36) 
217.9445 
(1.05) 
State House 
majority Democract 
-64600000 
(0.09) 
-0.0127545 
(-0.25) 
63000000 
(0.29) 
95900000 
(0.19) 
141.2313 
(0.68) 
 
* Natural log of defense expenditures (coefficient x 100 = % change) 
** Net fiscal benefit is expressed in per capita terms 
*** Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics  
This shift turned the country away from post-
New Deal egalitarianism towards neoconserva-
tism, signaled by the election of Ronald 
Reagan and further reinforced with the 
Republicans taking control of the United 
States Congress in 1994 and the election of 
George W. Bush in 2000. The shifts in power 
have both signaled a change in the debate 
over federalism and welfare state decentraliza-
tion. The “devolution revolution” proclaiming 
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the end of “big government” has undoubtedly 
been a mixed bag. Welfare was reformed in the 
mid-1990s with the passing of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, yet the “beast” of 
government has yet to be starved (Beland and 
de Chantal, 2004). Rather, neo-conservatism, 
as compared with earlier United States 
conservatism may be characterized by an 
idealist stance on foreign policy, a lesser social 
conservatism, and a much weaker dedication 
to a policy of minimal government. 
 
Evidence for partisan political rewards in 
higher-variation defense-related spending 
categories, an explicit neoconservative priority, 
is strong. Defense procurement dollars are 
show a positive effect for states that voted for 
a sitting Republican president, and states that 
send two Republican Senators to Capitol Hill. 
A state with two Republican Senators can 
expect 360 million more than a state with a 
bipartisan delegation, and nearly 700 million 
more than a state with an all-Democrat 
Senate delegation. Effects of similar 
magnitude hold for the category of total 
defense expenditures.  
 
Although it may be tempting to posit a purely 
partisan model of federal spending, it is most 
important to recognize the impacts of political 
alignment to the president and alignment with 
the majority parties of Congress, with the 
most interesting impacts found in different 
categories of spending. A vote for the sitting 
president elicits a negative impact on the 
lower-variation categories of grants awarded, 
retirement and disability and other payments. 
Alignment between the president and the 
governor, and the president and the 
controlling party of a state’s Congress is 
significant for different categories. Alignment 
between the federal and state executive 
branch procures more defense spending 
dollars for a state, whereas alignment between 
the federal executive branch and the state 
legislative branch has a positive impact on the 
lower-variation expenditure categories of 
grants awarded, other payments and the 
global category of total federal expenditures. 
This alignment variable exhibits a high degree 
of statistical significance and has never been 
studied before. Alignment with the Senate 
majority brings more money to a state in total 
procurement, whereas the impact in other 
categories is negligible. Alignment with the 
House majority has a negative impact on other 
payments, retirement and disability, other 
procurement and grants awarded to a state 
and a positive impact on all defense-related 
spending categories. It is difficult to isolate the 
impact of house members, as their primary 
responsibility is to their district. Districts are 
drawn through a political process, and are 
exceedingly prone to gerrymandering and do 
not necessarily adhere to any geo-political 
boundaries. As the district-by-district dataset 
is not available for the years chosen in this 
study, controlling for such discrepancies is 
rather difficult.  
 
A look at the allocation of the net fiscal benefit 
is can be modeled using both the partisan and 
the alignment models. In both models, using 
per capita amounts as the dependent variable, 
similar effects are observed for income per 
capita and GSP. Looking at the partisan 
model, a vote for the Republican president and 
having two Republican senators bodes well for 
a positive net fiscal benefit. On the contrary, 
an allocation of the net fiscal benefit using the 
majority alignment model shows a positive 
relation with all political variables, with 
President-Governor alignment, President-State 
Congress majority alignment and Senate maj-
ority alignment all significant, particularly the 
Senate variable with a significance level of 1%. 
A comparison of the distribution of the net 
fiscal benefit and political alignment follows in 
a graphic presentation. The importance of 
alignment with state-level executive and 
legislative alignment with the federal executive 
branch has grown significantly during the 
past twenty years, coinciding with the rise of 
the Republican Party across the country.  
 
The following figures present a graphic 
comparison of the political and economic 
results in respect to the net fiscal benefit. 
Data is presented for states that were not 
included in the empiricial analysis for graphic 
continuity. 
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Figure 5: Net Fiscal Benefit 2004 
 
 
Figure 5: States in blue receive a negative net 
fiscal benefit, whereas states in shades of red 
receive varying degrees of a positive net fiscal 
benefit. 
 
Figure 6: President-Governor Alignment 
 
 
Figure 6: The light blue states and the red 
states in the second graph benefit from party 
alignment with the sitting president, George 
W. Bush and their state’s Republican 
governor.11
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11 Source: Consolidated Federal Funds Report, The 
Books of the States, author’s own calculations. 
Figure 7: Net Fiscal Benefit 1994 
 
 
Figure 7: The states in shades of red receive a 
positive net fiscal benefit. 
 
Figure 8: President-Governor Alignment, 
2004 
 
 
Figure 8: States in purple and dark blue are 
aligned with the president and governor of the 
same party. All states in shades of blue on the 
second graph voted for the Democratic sitting 
president, Bill Clinton, whereas the states in 
red and purple voted the Republican 
presidential ticket.12
 
 
                                                 
12 Source: Consolidated Federal Funds Report, The 
Books of the States, author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 9: Net Fiscal Benefit 1984 
 
 
Figure 9: The states in shades of red receive a 
positive net fiscal benefit; the states in blue 
receive a negative net fiscal benefit. 
 
Figure 10: President-Governor Alignment, 
1984 
 
 
Figure 10: The states in red only are aligned 
with a Republican governor and the 
Republican president, Ronald Reagan. From 
this map it is clear that there have been 
steady Republican gains on the state executive 
level during the past twenty years.13
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13 Source: Conslidated Federal Funds Report, The Book 
of the States, author’s own calculations. 
Conclusion:  
 
The graph showing Democratic-voting states 
in 2004 presidential election does provide 
some interesting anecdotal evidence for a “red 
state-blue state” divide. Nonetheless, the 
empirical results from modeling federal 
transfers to the states and allocating the net 
fiscal benefit to the states show that in low 
variation categories where many payments are 
formula-based, there is little variation in 
monies transferred to the states. Other 
categories, particularly all defense-related 
spending, show an inclination towards pork-
barrel politics that reward the Republican 
Party faithful, the “base.” It is altogether 
unsurprising that defense spending figures 
more heavily into Republican-represented 
states, as the prevailing neoconservative 
element tends to prioritize defense spending. 
“Red” states voting for the Republican 
president in the last presidential election also 
saw a largely positive net fiscal benefit.  
 
Particular results of interest were alignment 
variables of high significance, showing 
alignment with the Senate majority for the 
allocation of the net fiscal benefit, 
Presidential-Gubernatorial alignment for many 
spending categories and the allocation of the 
net fiscal benefit, and President-State 
Congress majority party alignment. The latter, 
previously unstudied political variable is 
strongly correlated with a positive net fiscal 
benefit to a state, as well as increased 
spending in formula-based expenditures. 
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